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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

RONALD LEROY HARPER,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 980359-CA

Priority No. 2

:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for operation of a clandestine laboratory, a
first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-5 (Supp. 1998), in the
Second Judicial District Court in and for Weber County, State of Utah, the Honorable
Michael D. Lyon, presiding. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The issues presented on appeal are:
1. Has petitioner demonstrated that his trial counsel was ineffective? If a claim
of ineffectiveness is raised for the first time on appeal, it will reviewed only "if the trial
record is adequate to permit decision of the issue . . . ." State v. Humphries. 818 P.2d

1027, 1029 (Utah 1991).
2. Was the trial court's denial of defendant's request for a jury instruction
regarding accomplice testimony an abuse of discretion? An instruction to an
accomplice's testimony with caution "is entirely discretionary with the court, and [the
reviewing court] will reverse only when [the trial court] has abused that discretion."
State v. Pierce, 722 P.2d 780, 781 (Utah 1986); Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-7(2) (1995).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES
The following constitutional provisions and statutes are determinative of the
issues in this case:
United States Constitution, Amendment IV
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of counsel for his defense.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-7 (1995)
(1) A conviction may be had on the uncorroborated testimony of an
accomplice.
(2) In the discretion of the court, an instruction to the jury may be given
to the effect that such uncorroborated testimony should be viewed with
caution, and such an instruction shall be given if the trial judge finds the
testimony of the accomplice to be self contradictory, uncertain or
improbable.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Ronald Leroy Harper, was charged with one count of operating a
clandestine laboratory, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-5
(Supp. 1998) (R. 1). Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of the offense
charged (R. 160-61, 175: 142). The trial court sentenced defendant to a statutory fiveto-life term of imprisonment in the Utah State Prison (R. 160-61, 176: 5). Following
defendant's timely filing of a notice of appeal (R. 165), the Utah Supreme Court poured
this case over to this Court.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On September 10, 1997, at little after 11:00 p.m., the Weber-Morgan Narcotics
strike force executed a search warrant on 2214 Tyler Avenue in Ogden, Utah, the
residence of Ray Howe, a methamphetamine user previously convicted of possession
and distribution of controlled substances (R. 174: 13, 26-27, 70-73).l Members of the
strike force first entered through the front door of the home (R. 174: 74). Other
members of the strike force were waiting out back and entered through the back door
when they heard that nobody was found upstairs (R. 174:74). Inside, the police found
defendant, Patty Jepsen (defendant's girlfriend), Jeff Hill, Ray Howe, Sherrie Smith

1

The affidavit in support of the search warrant, unchallenged in any motion to
suppress, supported by numerous tips from a variety of informants, indicated that the
Howe residence was the base of operations for a methamphetamine lab operated by
defendant (R. 55-60).
3

(Ray Howe's girlfriend) and Terry Smith (Sherrie's brother) (R.174: 18-19).
Deputy Doug Coleman, the field supervisor of the Weber-Morgan Narcotics
Strike Force, entered through the back door of the residence and saw three individuals
standing at the base of the stairs to the basement (R. 174: 74-76). Deputy Coleman
ordered the three individuals, who were not particularly cooperative, to get on the
ground with their hands up (R. 174: 75). Detective Shawn Hamblin came down the
stairs behind Deputy Coleman. As Detective Hamblin was working his way to the
three individuals, he noticed someone in a red shirt, later positively identified as
defendant, come from the lab area, and then run and hide behind some ductwork (R.
174: 91-92, 97, 99-100).2 Detective Hamblin commanded several times that defendant
show himself and get down on the ground (R. 174: 91, 97). Detective Hamblin then
noticed another male, Jeff Hill, also hiding behind the ductwork (R. 174: 92).
After the officers' persistent yelling, both defendant and Hill lay down on the
ground. They were then handcuffed and separated (R. 174: 92-93). Defendant initially
lied to Detective Mike Donehoo, stating that his name was David Flowers (R.175: 44,
91). However, Detective Donehoo had brought a photograph of defendant with him
and knew defendant's correct name, Ronald Leroy Harper, which defendant thereafter

2

Sergeant Tony Huemiller also noticed a person with a red shirt coming from
the lab area. Defendant was the only person at the house who was wearing a red shirt
(R. 174: 97, 99).
4

acknowledged (R. 175: 44, 81). At the time of his arrest, defendant was on probation
for possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute (R. 175: 88, 96-97).
The methamphetamine lab was discovered in the basement and to the right, the
first room around the corner, where defendant was first seen by detectives (R.174: 97,
100; R. 175: 27). According to Jeff Hill, the lab was only a couple of feet away
whichever way one turned in the basement (R. 175: 44). Its presence was inescapable
without even seeing it from the strong odor of chemicals which burned Deputy
Coleman's eyes and lungs (R. 174: 77, 79-80, 85-86). Ron Larsen, agent with the
federal Drug Enforcement Agency, could smell the chemicals from the kitchen, directly
above the basement (R. 175: 4-6). Don Thurgood, chemist with the Utah State Crime
Laboratory, found chemicals and numerous pieces of equipment indicating an
operational methamphetamine lab, including beakers, glass bottles, a scale containing
methamphetamine residue, hydrochloric acid (a component needed to make
methamphetamine), and ephedrine (a precursor in the manufacture of
methamphetamine) (R. 174: 101-03, 105-06, 113-20).3 Mr. Thurgood's general
observations of laboratory equipment and chemicals and his opinion that the basement

3

Mr. Thurgood also testified that it is common not to find usable fingerprints
on clandestine lab equipment, as in this case, because the acids and bases used in the
manufacture of methamphetamine tend to dry the skin, eliminating the oils necessary
for the transfer of fingerprints (R. 174: 106-07). None of the surfaces tested in this
case displayed fingerprints of sufficient quality to undertake an analysis or identify
anyone (R. 174: 128-29).
5

area harbored a clandestine drug lab was were corroborated by Ron Larsen and Lynn
Horspool, agent with the Utah State Investigations Bureau (R. 175: 4, 20, 26, 28, 3034). Additionally, Agent Horspool stated that Mr. Thurgood's discovery of
methamphetamine and ephedrine together in a jar indicated that the chemicals were then
approaching the end of the "cooking" process (R. 175: 26).
Immediately following the execution of the warrant, Ray Howe confessed an
illicit arrangement with defendant and directed agents to drugs in his personal
possession before any search uncovered them and before any kind offer was made to
him (R. 174: 13, 21-22).4 Howe told Detective Donehoo that he allowed defendant to
make methamphetamine in his basement in return for a fourth of the methamphetamine
that was manufactured (R. 174: 13-14). Prior to the raid, the lab was up and operating
for about 6 to 8 months (R. 174: 26-27). In the two weeks prior to the raid, defendant
was at Howe's house ten days, never to visit but rather only to manufacture
methamphetamine-he and defendant talked about the manufacturing of
methamphetamine all the time (R. 174: 15-16). Howe also implicated Jeff Hill, stating
that Hill was defendant's gopher, purchasing phosphorus, distilled water and muriatic
acid and hauling trash from the lab (R. 174: 17-18).

4

In exchange for Howe's testimony, charges against him for possession of a
methamphetamine lab and possession of methamphetamine within 1000 feet of a school
or a park were reduced from first to second degree felonies (R. 174: 24).
6

Jeff Hill had also been previously convicted of operating a clandestine
methamphetamine lab and was currently serving time in the Utah State Prison for a
parole violation (R. 174: 34). He testified that he had known defendant for a couple
years, and he corroborated the arrangement referenced by Howe that he had with
defendant (R. 174: 35-37).5 This arrangement primarily consisted of Hill's purchasing
supplies that were used to make the methamphetamine (R. 174: 35-37). Defendant
would provide Hill with a list of the supplies and ingredients that were needed (R. 174:
37). Occasionally, Hill would help defendant by taking the garbage outside (R. 174:
43). In return Hill would receive drugs for his participation in the operation (R. 174:
37, 41). On the night the warrant was executed, defendant was "pulling" ephedrine, a
precursor of methamphetamine, and Hill was wearing gloves to protect himself from
the harmful chemicals used in manufacturing methamphetamine as he disposed of them
in the garbage (R. 174: 42-44).
Defendant was on probation for possession of methamphetamine with intent to
distribute at the time of his arrest (R. 175: 88, 96-97). He testified that he had known
Howe about six to eight months prior to the execution of the warrant and had been to
his house only a couple of times (R. 175: 82). He claimed that when the warrant was

5

In exchange for Hill's testimony, a charge against him for possession of a
methamphetamine lab was reduced to a second degree felony and a charge of
absconding was dismissed (R. 174: 47-48, 51-25).
7

executed he had been at Howe's home for only about fifteen minutes and only to collect
$50 for a lawn mower he had previously delivered to Howe (R. 175: 82-83, 90). At
the time of his arrest he denied to Detective Donehoo his true identity and his
acquaintance with any of the people then present at the residence, and at trial he denied
knowing of the presence of a methamphetamine lab or smelling any chemicals in the
Howe residence (R. 175: 44-45, 86-87). However, in addition to contrary testimony
previously set forth, defendant admitted at trial that he knew Jeff Hill and implied that
he had been acquainted with Sherrie Smith and her brother Terry (R. 175: 90, 93).
Sherrie testified that she had met defendant three months prior to the execution of the
warrant, that defendant had been to Howe's house more than ten times in the two
weeks preceding the execution of the warrant, and that on the night in question
defendant had arrived at the house between 8:00 p.m. and 9:00 p.m., several hours
before the execution of the warrant (R. 175: 99-102).6
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I

Because defendant has failed to provide any evidence whatsoever about

what witnesses should have been called or what they would have testified to at trial,

6

Further bearing on defendant's credibility are the following facts adduced at
trial: (1) defendant claimed he could not recall if his prior drug conviction was for
possession of methamphetamine or possession with intent to distribute, or that he was
on probation for a second degree felony, arguing that his attorney had handled the
whole affair, and (2) defendant claimed he did know that he had been assigned a parole
officer in connection with his prior conviction (R. 175: 88-91).
8

this Court should decline to consider his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Alternatively, defendant has failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel for
lack of a supporting record.
POINT II

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give a cautionary

instruction on accomplice testimony because such testimony was substantially
confirmed by independent sources. In view of instructions equivalent to that proffered
by defendant, and defense counsel's alerting the jury to the accomplices' interest in
testifying against defendant, any error in refusing to give the requested instruction was,
at most, harmless.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
BECAUSE DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO IDENTIFY ANY
UNCALLED WITNESSES OR TO PROVIDE THE SUBSTANCE OF
THEIR ALLEGED TESTIMONY, THIS COURT SHOULD
DECLINE TO CONSIDER HIS CLAIM OF INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
"[An appellate court] review[s] a challenge of ineffective assistance of counsel
by first determining whether counsel's performance was deficient and, if so,
determining whether the deficient performance prejudiced defendant. State v.
Severance, 828 P.2d 1066, 1070 (Utah App. 1992) (citing Strickland v. Washington.
446 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984)).
"Proof of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be a speculative matter but

must be a demonstrable reality." Fernandez v. Cook. 870 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993).
Thus, when a defendant raises an ineffective assistance claim for the first time on
appeal, the claim should be reviewed only "if the . . . record is adequate to permit
decision of the issue." State v. Humphries. 818 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah 1991).
Further, an appellate court will "assume the regularity of the proceedings below when
appellant fails to provide an adequate record on appeal." State v. Blubaugh. 904 P.2d
688, 699 (Utah App. 1995), cert, denied. 913 P.2d 749 (Utah 1996) (citing Jolivet v.
Cook. 784 P.2d 1148, 1150 (Utah 1989)). In State v. Wulffenstein. 657 P.2d 289
(Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court stated:
When a defendant predicates error to [an appellate court], he has
the duty and responsibility of supporting such allegation by an adequate
record. Absent that record, defendant's assignment of error stands as a
unilateral allegation which the review court has no power to determine.
This Court simply cannot rule on a question which depends for its
existence upon alleged facts unsupported by the record.
Id. at 293 (citations omitted).7
Defendant argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel

7

See also rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure ("The argument
shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues
presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial
court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on.");
State v. Thomas. 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998) (refusing to consider inadequately
briefed claim under rule 24(a)(9), and stating "that this court is not "'a depository in
which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research'") (quoting
State v. Bishop. 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988)) (original citation omitted).
10

in failing to subpoena any witnesses in his behalf. App. Br. at 8. However, because
defendant has failed to assert or provide this Court with any record in support of his
claim, this Court should decline to even consider it.8 Alternatively, defendant's claim
fails for lack of record support. See State v. Arguelles. 921 P.2d 439, 441 (Utah 1996)
(rejecting ineffective assistance upon claim counsel prevented the defendant from
testifying where neither the record nor the defendant's brief indicated what his
testimony would have been if he had testified); State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 183, 188
n.26 (Utah 1990) (finding that the defendant had failed to show prejudice in his
counsel's failure to investigate a particular witness because "[he had] not provided this
court with any evidence concerning what [the witness] would have testified to if he had
been called during trial"); State v. Callahan. 866 P.2d 590, 593 (Utah App. 1993)

Additionally, defendant has at no point moved for an evidentiary hearing,
pursuant to rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, to create a record
establishing ineffective assistance of counsel. Moreover, based on the facts of this
case, it seems improbable that defendant could create such a record. See State v.
Callahan, 866 P.2d 590, 593-94 (Utah App. 1993) (rejecting claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel where "essentially every participant in or observer of the events
culminating in defendant's arrest testified at trial). Although neither Patty Jepsen,
defendant's girlfriend, or Terry Smith testified, it is apparent that these witnesses were
known to defense counsel and were likely rejected for strategic reasons, i.e, Jepsen
acknowledges in a letter to the trial court that she too was a drug user (R. 48), and
defendant nowhere suggests that either witness would have been helpful. See State v.
Crosby. 927 P.2d 638, 644 (Utah 1996) (the reviewing court will give trial counsel
wide latitude in making tactical decisions and will not question such decisions unless
there is no reasonable basis supporting them) (citing Taylor v. Warden. 905 P.2d 277,
282 (Utah 1995)).
11

(summarily disposing of claim of ineffective assistance of counsel where neither the
record nor defendant's brief identified witnesses that counsel failed to subpoena or
alleged the substance of their testimony); Severance. 828 P.2d at 1070 (finding no
reasonable probability of a different result at trial where the record did not indicate
whether a witness would have testified more favorably at trial, and evidence against the
defendant was overwhelming). In sum, this Court should reject defendants claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED JURY
INSTRUCTION ON ACCOMPLICE TESTIMONY.
Defendant argues that the trial court prejudicially erred in refusing to grant his
request for an instruction directing the jury to view with caution the allegedly
uncorroborated testimony of Howe and Hill, defendant's two accomplices. App. Br. at
9. The claim fails because (1) independent evidence corroborated the accomplices'
testimony, (2) the accomplices' testimony was not "self contradictory, uncertain, or
improbable," and (3) even if the court should have given the instruction, the error was
harmless because the accomplices' credibility in this case was rigorously challenged
and other instructions fully informed the jury to weigh any testimony in light of the

12

witnesses' biases and interests.9
On appeal, defendant argues that Howe's and Hill's testimony, to wit: that
defendant arranged with them to run a methamphetamine lab, was uncorroborated
because no evidence, other than his presence in the home, connected him with the
methamphetamine lab. App. Br. at 10.10 However, contrary to defendant's claim,
other evidence corroborated that defendant was not merely present at Howe's home,
but was an active participant in the operation of the methamphetamine lab at the time

9

The transcript of defendant's requested instruction, ensuing argument and the
court's ruling (R: 175: 107-111) is attached at Addendum A.
10

In the trial court, defendant requested the following instruction, pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-7 (1995):
A defendant may be found guilty on the uncorroborated testimony of an
accomplice; however, such testimony should be viewed with caution, and
the jury should consider the motives of the accomplice and the benefits
the accomplice may stand t o gain by testifying in determining credibility
and the weight such testimony should be given.
(R. 101) (attached at Addendum B).
In support of his requested instruction, defendant argued that the testimony of
defendant's alleged accomplices, Ray Howe and Jeff Hill, was uncorroborated because
"corroboration" required independent physical evidence, such as fingerprints, to link
him to the methamphetamine lab, which was absent in this case (R.175: 107-109).
Defendant has not claimed on appeal that "corroboration" must attain so high a level of
probativeness. In any case, authority cited by the State makes clear that corroborative
evidence need not be the substantial equivalent of evidence independently proving
defendant's guilt.

13

the police executed the warrant.
Section 77-17-7 permits a trial court, in its discretion, to give a cautionary
instruction when a prosecution is based exclusively on the testimony of an accomplice
and the accomplice's testimony is uncorroborated.11 In State v. Kerekes. 622 P.2d
1161 (Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme Court stated:
This Court has previously stated that the corroboration need not go to all
the material facts as testified to by the accomplice, nor need it be
sufficient in itself to support a conviction. However, the corroborating
evidence must connect the defendant with the commission of the offense
and be consistent with his guilt and inconsistent with his innocence.
kL at 1167 (citations omitted). See State v. Neelev. 748 P.2d 1091, 1096 (Utah 1988)
(no abuse of discretion in trial court's refusing cautionary instruction where
"[accomplice's] testimony was not the only evidence linking defendants to the crime,
and . . .other evidence substantially corroborated [accomplice's] testimony"). See also
Webster's New World Dictionary 332 (College ed. 1956) ("Corroborate" means "to
strengthen, to make more certain, to confirm, to support"). Thus, corroborating

11

Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-7 (1995) provides:

(1) A conviction may be had on the uncorroborated testimony of an
accomplice.
(2) In the discretion of the court, an instruction to the jury may be given
to the effect that such uncorroborated testimony should be viewed with
caution, and such an instruction shall be given if the trial judge finds the
testimony of the accomplice to be self contradictory, uncertain or
improbable.
14

evidence need not be actual physical evidence connecting to the offense, but merely
evidence that confirms or supports the connection.12
On the facts of this case the court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Ray
Howe and Jeff Hill's inculpatory testimony was corroborated by other witnesses'
testimony.13 The testimony of law enforcement officials undisputedly established that at
the time police executed the warrant there was a methamphetamine lab in Howe's
basement (R. 174: 101-03, 105-06, 113-20; 175: 4, 20, 26, 28, 30-34), that it was then

12

That "corroboration" does not amount to evidence virtually sufficient to
convict is further supported by Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-18 (1953), the predecessor
statute to section 77-17-7, which provided:
A conviction shall not be had on the testimony of an accomplice,
unless he is corroborated by other evidence, which in itself and without
the aid of the testimony of the accomplice tends to connect the defendant
with the commission of the offense; and the corroboration shall not be
sufficient, if it merely shows the commission of the offense or the
circumstances thereof. [Emphasis added.]
13

Defendant does not specifically challenge with legal analysis or authority the
trial court's additional finding that the accomplices also corroborated their own
testimony (R. 175: 111). Because defendant has failed to adequately brief this issue,
see State v. Amicone. 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984), and because other witnesses
sufficiently corroborated the accomplices' testimony as set out below, this Court need
not address this issue. However, the State acknowledges in passing that the trial
court's view that accomplices may corroborate their own testimony, although not yet
addressed in Utah, is contrary to the general view. See 29A Am Jur 2d Evidence §
1490 (1994); Commonwealth v. Almeida. 452 A.2d 512, 516 (Pa. 1982) (even where a
conviction may be based on uncorroborated accomplice testimony, it is "reversible
error for a trial judge to allow a jury to infer from his instructions, by negative
inference or otherwise, that the testimony of one accomplice may be used to
corroborate that of another accomplice").
15

in actual operation (R. 174: 119; 175: 26), and that from its effect on the eyes and
lungs and the odor of the chemicals in other parts of the house, its presence was
unmistakable (R. 174: 77, 79-80, 85-86; 175: 4-6) . Detectives Hamblin and
Huemiller observed defendant and Hill run from the lab area and then attempt to hide
behind the ductwork (R. 174: 91-92, 97, 99-100). Officer Donehoo testified that
defendant attempted to conceal his identity by giving him a false name (R. 48). See
State v. Dvett. 199 P.2d 155, 158-59 (Utah 1948) (impliedly holding that giving false
name consistent with criminal intent). Additionally, both defendant himself at trial and
Sherrie Smith confirmed Howe's and Hill's collective testimony that defendant had
been to the Howe residence frequently and, despite his denials at the crime scene, knew
the other people discovered on the premises, most of whom were either
methamphetamine users or manufacturers (R. 48, 174: 26-27, 34; 175: 90, 93, 99102; R. 175: 99). Also, Smith testified that although she had never seen defendant
exchange drugs with Howe, she had observed them in possession of drugs after the
drugs had been exchanged (R. 175: 100). In sum, this testimony independently
confirmed or supported the accomplices' testimony and "tended to connect with the
commission of the offense," justifying the trial court's denial of defendant's requested
instruction.
Furthermore, it is evident that a mandatory cautionary instruction is not required
in this case. "Section 77-17-7 states that a cautionary instruction must be given [/the
16

accomplice testimony is 'uncorroborated' and 'the trial judge finds the testimony of the
accomplice to be self contradictory, uncertain or improbable.'" State v. Dunn, 850
P.2d 1201, 1226 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Defendant has not
argued that a cautionary instruction was mandated by the circumstances, see Amicone.
689 P.2d at 1344, and the record plainly does not contain a factual basis for requiring a
mandatory instruction.
Finally, even if the trial court did err in refusing the proffered instruction, the
error was harmless. In Dunn, the court found harmless accomplice testimony
concerning the charge of reckless manslaughter where the jury was made aware that the
accomplice had a motive to testify favorably for the prosecution, the jury was instructed
to take into account bias, interest, or motive in assessing credibility, the accomplice
was repeatedly impeached, defense counsel underscored the accomplice's dubious
credibility in closing argument, and the jury was further instructed that "if you believe
any witness has wilfully testified falsely . . . you are at liberty to disregard the whole of
the testimony of such witness." Dunn, 850 P.2d 1226-28.
This case is indistinguishable from Dunn: (1) defense counsel repeatedly and
extensively challenged Howe and Hill on their having received favorable plea bargains
in exchange for their testimony (R. 174: 24-30, 47-50, 66-68); (2) in lieu of giving
defendant's requested instruction, the trial court noted that it had instructed the jury to
consider the credibility of witnesses and that it should consider a witness's bias,
17

interests, and motives;14 (3) on cross examination, defense counsel effectively
challenged Howe's and Hill's credibility;15 (4) in both opening and closing argument
defense counsel argued at length the accomplices' past criminal history, the favorable
deals they had received in exchange for their testimony, and their motives to lie (R.
174: 9-11, 125-30); and (5) the trial court also instructed the jury that if it believed a
witness had lied, it could disregard the witness's entire testimony (Jury instruction #15,

14

Jury instruction #16 stated:

You are the exclusive judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the
weight of the evidence. In judging the weight of the testimony and
credibility of the witnesses, you have a right to take into consideration any
biases, any interest in the result, and any motive or lack of motive to
testify fairly. You may consider the witnesses' conduct while testifying
before you, the reasonableness of their statements, their apparent
frankness or candor, or the want of it, their opportunity to know, their
ability to understand, and their capacity to remember. You should
consider these matters you believe have a bearing on the truthfulness or
accuracy of the witnesses' statements.
(R. 122, attached at Addendum C).
15

Specifically, defense counsel elicited from Howe that he was a
methamphetamine user with past drug convictions and probation violations who had
curried favor with the police by immediately disclosing his involvement and personal
drug stash which could not be hidden from the police given that police would search the
entire premises anyhow (R. 174: 25-32). Defense counsel elicited from Hill that he too
was a methamphetamine user with a lengthy history of convictions and probation
violations, who initially lied to the police about his identity and who evaded
responsibility for being a methamphetamine manufacturer (R. 174: 52-54, 56-58).
18

R. 121).l6
In sum, given that independent evidence corroborated the accomplices'
testimony, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give the jury a
cautionary instruction, and any error in failing to so instruct the jury was harmless.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully requests that
defendant's conviction be affirmed.
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUESTED
Because this case presents no complex or novel questions, the State does not
request that it be set for oral argument or that a published opinion issue.
^<

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / f

day of October, 1998.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

KENNETH A. BRONSTON
Assistant Attorney General
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Jury instruction #15 provides:

If you believe any witness has willfully testified falsely as to any
material matter, you may disregard the entire testimony of that witness,
except as that witness my have been corroborated by other credible
evidence.
(R. 121, attached at Addendum C).
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

MR. RETALLICK:
THE COURT:

Thank you, Your Honor.

Here's the instruction.

MR. RETALLICK:

I have a copy here, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. RETALLICK:

It's based on language out of Utah

Code Annotated Section 77-17-7, and also based on the
Supreme Court of Utah decision of State versus George Ray
Neeley, 748 P. 2d 1091, decision from January of 1988.
The instruction we are requesting is that a
defendant -- this is on -- concerning testimony of an
accomplice:

A defendant may be found guilty on the

uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice; however, such
testimony should be viewed with caution, and the jury should
consider the motives of the accomplice and the benefits the
accomplice may stand to gain by testifying in determining
the credibility and the weight such testimony should be
given.
I feel that based on the fact that we have two
individuals, co-defendants, testifying against my client,
that they do not necessarily corroborate each other's
testimony.

That I believe the corroboration aspect has to

be some independent evidence, for example, actual physical
evidence linking my client to the operation or possession of
precursor material or the operation of the lab.

I don't

believe simply the testimony of the individuals is

Laurie Shingle, C.S.R.
(801) 395-1055
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sufficient to sustain the conviction, and that's why I ask
for this jury instruction to be given,
THE COURT:

Thank you.

Mr. Saunders, would you like to respond, please?
MR. SAUNDERS:

Your Honor, I think under the

reading of the statute, it's discretionary with the Court,
first of all, whether you give this instruction.

And I

don't think that this instruction is warranted in this case
because I do not believe that the testimony of the
co-defendant, or even both co-defendants, is uncorroborated
in this case.

I think that they corroborate each other.

There is corroboration through the testimony that was given
through the Strike Force agents, through the testimony of
Sheri Smith, some things that she testified to about the
defendant.
I think evidence received from the defendant when he
testified in some of the answers that he gave could be
corroboration when considered with the statements that he's
made before.
So I don't think that the instruction is warranted
under this case.

I think that other instruction the Court

has proposed adequately tells the jury about how they should
view each witnesses' testimony and to look for biases in
that and consider the motives of the people that are
testifying, and I think that is sufficient.

Laurie Shingle, C.S.R.
(801) 395-1055
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THE COURT:

Thank you.

Any response that you wish to make?
MR. RETALLICK:

Yes. He indicated that Sheri Smith

4

corroborated some of the information.

The only thing she

5

testified about is the defendant being present in the house

6

on more occasions than what the defendant admitted himself.

7

She never testified that she ever saw the defendant in

8

possession of narcotics.

9

unaware that he was involved or that there was even a lab in

She testified she doesn't -- was

10

the house.

11

conversations between my client and any of the other

12

co-defendants concerning methamphetamine or the manufacture.

13

She testified that she never saw drugs change hands, so she

14

didn't corroborate anything.

15

She testified that she was privy to no

The Strike Force members simply placed my client in the

16

vicinity of the lab at the time they raided the home.

17

was no corroboration as far as his actual physical

18

possession of the lab equipment and, in fact, the evidence

19

shows that there were well over 65 items of evidence that

20

were taken, no fingerprints linking my client to it. And

21

the only thing actually linking my client to the possession

22

of this lab equipment or the precursor or anything that

23

constitutes a crime in that basement was simply the

24

testimony of the co-defendants.

25

MR. SAUNDERS:

I think there needs to be a

Laurie Shingle, C.S.R.

There

110

distinction made about the direct evidence as well as the
circumstantial evidence.
in court.

Both types of evidence are allowed

There is plenty of circumstantial evidence to

corroborate the testimony of these two co-defendants.

I

don't think it has to be a smoking gun, as Mr. Retallick
would like to see, a fingerprint, somebody catching or
possession.

That isn't what is required.

corroborated by circumstantial evidence.

It is
And for those

reasons, I don't believe the instruction is warranted.
THE COURT:
the instruction.
clear.

Thank you.

The Court declines to grant

I'll put it with the file so that it is

In fact, I'll just write here "denied."

Put that

hopefully with the file.
The Court declines to give the instruction for the
following reasons.

The law provides in 77-17-7 that a

defendant may be found guilty on the uncorroborated
testimony of accomplice, however, such testimony should be
viewed with caution -- or it goes on to say that such
testimony should be viewed with caution.
And then it goes on further to state under what
circumstances the Court shall give an instruction.

I don't

believe that that is one of these cases for the reason that
I view the statute as, in effect, addressing the situation
where there are -- there are perhaps two people involved and
one person's testimony against the other, and there being no

Laurie Shingle, C.S.R.
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other corroborating evidence, so that one person is saying
he did it and the other one person is saying he didn't.

In

that kind of an instance, I suppose that one should view
with caution the testimony of an accomplice.
In this case, however, we have several -- not just an
accomplice, but several accomplices who are corroborating of
each other and corroborating of the State's evidence. And,
therefore, on that basis I don't know that it's appropriate.
Further, in the Court's Instruction Number 16, I
believe adequately protects the rights of the accused in
providing the kind of guidance to the jury as it evaluates
the accomplice testimony.

In pertinent part it says, in

judging the weight of the testimony and credibility of the
witnesses, you have a right to take into consideration any
biases, any interest in the result, and any motive or lack
of motive to testify fairly.
And those kind of -- that kind of instruction lies at
the very heart of this case and I think that it's giving the
jury adequate instruction.
All right.

I think that does it.

Let's go in and I'll

let you argue to the jury.
(WHEREUPON, at this time the conference in chambers
concludes, after which proceedings resume in the hearing of
the jury, as follows:)
THE COURT: We appreciate your patience.

Laurie Shingle, C.S.R.

In a few

ADDENDUM B

INSTRUCTION NO.
TESTIMONY OF AN ACCOMPLICE
A defendant may be found guilty on the uncorroborated testimony of an
accomplice; however, such testimony should be viewed with caution, and the
jury should consider the motives of the accomplice and the benefits the
accomplice may stand to gain by testifying* („ ^Ur^may
u^c^kr 5"CU i^i

credibility *^
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ADDENDUM C

INSTRUCTION NO.
If you believe any witness has willfully testified
falsely as to any material matter, you may disregard the entire
testimony of that witness, except as that witness may have been
corroborated by other credible evidence.

INSTRUCTION NO.

It,

You are the exclusive judges of the credibility of the
witnesses and the weight of the evidence. In judging the weight
of the testimony and credibility of the witnesses, you have a
right to take into consideration any biases, any interest in the
result, and any motive or lack of motive to testify fairly. You
may consider the witnesses1 conduct while testifying before you,
the reasonableness of their statements, their apparent frankness
or candor, or the want of it, their opportunity to know, their
ability to understand, and their capacity to remember. You should
consider these matters you believe have a bearing on the
truthfulness or accuracy of the witnesses1 statements.

